Side Channel Attacks Database
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Attacks of embedded systems and associated counter-measures |
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Christophe Giraud, |
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PhD THESIS 2007 |
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| Abstract: |
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Side channel attacks are a very powerful tool used to recover secrets stored in embedded devices such as smart cards. By analysing the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiations
or by disturbing the device, an attacker can easily obtain secret keys used by non protected embedded cryptosystems. The subject of this thesis is to extend the impact of side channel
analysis by presenting new attacks and new countermeasures. The latter must have a very small impact on the performance of the algorithm since the embedded environment is limited in terms
of both memory space and computation power.
Firstly, we focus on Power Analysis countermeasures. We describe a method to protect the elliptic curve scalar multiplication from Simple Analysis. Then, we propose a countermeasure against Differential Analysis on DES and AES and a generic method to protect S-Box access. Secondly, we deal with Fault Attacks. After presenting a general overview of this field, we propose new fault attacks on cryptosystems such as AES and XTR which haven’t yet been successfully impacted. Then, we improve some existing attacks on several signature schemes in order to be able to put these attacks into practice. Finally, we present new countermeasures on XTR and on the RSA cryptosystem. |
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| Paper Available At: |
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http://www.prism.uvsq.fr/index.php?id=206 |
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